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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1293 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  ERNEST DAVID KEYS, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2-05-cr-00617) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 25, 2017 
Before:  SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 31, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se petitioner Ernest David Keys seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to grant him 
sentencing relief regarding his criminal conviction.  Keys also has filed a motion for an 
emergency hearing relating to his claims for sentencing relief.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the mandamus petition and related motion. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Keys’s conviction resulted from his 2007 guilty plea to conspiracy to interfere 
with interstate commerce by robbery and to interference with interstate commerce by 
robbery.  The District Court imposed a 151-month term of imprisonment, sentencing 
Keys as a career offender—i.e., as having been convicted of one or more “crimes of 
violence” as defined in the “residual clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).  Keys waived his 
rights to appellate and collateral review; on direct appeal, we granted the Government’s 
motion to enforce the appellate waiver. 
In 2013, Keys filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  The District Court denied the motion in May 2015.  In July 2015, Keys filed a 
motion to amend or supplement his prior § 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the definition of 
“violent felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), is void for vagueness as a matter of due process.  The District 
Court denied the motion on the merits.  Keys filed a pro se appeal, docketed at C.A. 
No. 15-3588.  We retained jurisdiction, stayed the appeal, and remanded the matter for 
the District Court to consider Keys’s correspondence as a motion to extend and reopen 
the time to appeal under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6).  
The District Court granted the motion under Rule 4(a)(6) and later appointed the Federal 
Community Defender’s Office to litigate Keys’s Johnson claim. 
In April 2016, appointed counsel filed an application for this Court’s authorization 
to file a second or successive § 2255 motion to raise Keys’s claim that his § 4B1.2(a)(2) 
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career offender sentence was unconstitutional in light of Johnson,1 recognizing the 
prerequisite of authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to pursue a second § 2255 motion.  
That matter was docketed at C.A. No. 16-2055.  In light of the pending § 2244 
application, counsel filed a motion for voluntary dismissal in Keys’s appeal at C.A. 
No. 15-3588.  Accordingly, in June 2016, the Clerk issued the requested voluntary 
dismissal order.2  Pending the outcome of the § 2244 application, counsel filed a 
protective § 2255 motion in the District Court, raising Keys’s Johnson claim. 
In February 2017, Keys filed this pro se mandamus petition; he was granted leave 
to proceed in forma pauperis in April 2017.  Among other things, he states that counsel 
informed him that his case would not be decided until the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Beckles v. United States, S. Ct. No. 15-8544, but he believes that a stay 
pending Beckles is unnecessary.  Indeed, both this Court and the District Court entered 
stay orders in the proceedings on Keys’s § 2244 application and his protective § 2255 
motion.  Keys argues that his case is distinguishable from Beckles on its facts.  Thus, he 
asks us to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the District Court to rule on the § 2255 
motion filed by counsel. 
                                              
1 Keys asserts that the residual clause definition of “crime of violence” in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is 
identical to the ACCA residual clause definition of “violent felony” that was invalidated 
in Johnson, and that his sentence enhancement under § 4B1.2(a)(2) is similarly 
unconstitutional. 
 
2 To the extent that Keys suggests in his filings in this matter that we currently retain 
jurisdiction in his appeal at C.A. No. 15-3588, he is mistaken, as that matter remains 
closed upon the Clerk’s order of voluntary dismissal. 
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At the time Keys submitted his mandamus petition to this Court, the protectively-
filed § 2255 motion was still pending before the District Court.  However, the record 
reflects that on March 22, 2017, counsel filed a motion to withdraw the § 2255 motion, 
which the District Court granted later that same day, dismissing Keys’s § 2255 motion.  
Because the District Court has reached a disposition of Keys’s § 2255 motion, Keys has 
received the relief sought in his mandamus petition.  Thus, we will dismiss the petition, 
as it has become moot.  See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 
(3d Cir. 1996).   
For similar reasons, we deny Keys’s motion for an emergency hearing, which 
relates to his underlying § 2255 proceedings.  In his motion, Keys contends that he is 
entitled to a new sentencing hearing and a recall of the mandate in his § 2255 proceedings 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016) (relating to ACCA sentencing).  Keys filed similar motions based on Mathis in his 
District Court proceedings.  The District Court since has denied Keys’s motions, noting 
that any amendment to his prior § 2255 motion based on Johnson would be futile in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles,3 and that Keys’s new request for § 2255 
relief would be an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion.  As the District 
Court has issued its rulings with respect to the underlying § 2255 proceedings, including 
                                              
3 The Supreme Court issued its decision in Beckles on March 6, 2017, after Keys filed 
this mandamus petition.  See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).  Beckles 
was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause.  The 
Supreme Court rejected Beckles’s argument that § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause was 
unconstitutionally vague under Johnson, holding that the advisory Guidelines are not 
subject to a due process vagueness challenge and that § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is not 
void for vagueness.  See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 897. 
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Keys’s Mathis arguments, Keys’s request for an emergency hearing on the matter is now 
moot.  To the extent that Keys disagrees with the District Court’s rulings, mandamus 
must not be used as a substitute for an appeal.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 
211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus.  The motion for 
an emergency hearing is denied. 
